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This article presents a new approach to the comparison of the meaning of social or political 
key terms in different national contexts. Instead of relying on classical statistical instruments 
such as t-tests of the mean attitudes, the author proposes to analyze value confl icts between 
the mentioned groups. In international surveys like the European Values Study (EVS) the 
related confl ict data are not directly available but can be generated by microsimulation: 
for this purpose the article proposes to look at the value differences of randomly matched 
artifi cial pairs of respondents. The resulting dyadic data-records correspond to simulated 
virtual encounters of persons with the same or different opinions about a political issue. In 
this way it becomes possible to measure the amount and the thematic focus of the value 
confl icts between the protagonists of a key term in different countries: the absence of confl icts 
between these groups points to the same meaning of the key term, whereas dissent about 
its attributes is an indicator of semantic differences. The benchmark for assessing these 
international inter-group confl icts are the national intra-group confl icts, which are generally 
underestimated. Consequently, an application of the proposed method to an artifi cial dataset 
with systematically varying statistical properties suggests that the traditional t-tests of mean 
attitudes overestimate the international group differences. By considering the internal 
ideological variation of the compared groups we probably get a more realistic assessment 
of their international similarities and differences. Thus we dare to tackle with the proposed 
virtual encounter method a real world problem: the comparative analysis of the values of 
the political left in Sweden, France, and the UK on the basis of attitudes gathered in the 
European Values Study (2008). A major result is that income equality is revealed to be an 
important common value of the political left in the three countries mentioned. Finally, the 
article points to the possibility of comparing different intra-national groups with regard to their 
ideologies. By the virtual encounter method it is possible to focus the analysis on a particular 
country and compare e.g. its national parties or different generations of partisans.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is an increasing number of international survey projects like the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2015), the European Values Study (EVS 2008), 
or the European Social Survey (ESS 2015), which claim to produce internationally 
comparable interview data. Important measures taken toward achieving this 
goal are careful translations into the different national languages of the survey, 
extended pretests of the questionnaires, etc. (Saris & Gallhofer 2007, Harkness, 
Van de Vijver & Mohler 2003, Harkness 2007, Harkness & al. 2010). In spite of 
all these methodological efforts it is still possible that international comparisons of 
interview answers are impaired by the different meanings of concepts in different 
countries (Hantrais 2007: 14-15), something which endangers the validity of their 
measurement.
Left or right politics are important and typical examples of such ambiguous 
concepts. Their meaning for a nation’s citizens depends among other things on 
the political alternatives in the national party systems, which obviously vary from 
country to country and often also change over time. In a two-party system like that 
of the USA left and right have different meanings than in a European multi-party 
system like that of Germany. Similarly, in countries that have experienced the 
rise of a new populist right-wing party the meaning of left and right has recently 
changed. Finally, not all party systems have started in the same historical moment 
and consequently differ from country to country, as the example of Eastern Europe 
demonstrates (Lewis 2000).
Fig. 1: Tackling the problem of semantic gaps by analyzing the attributes of a social 
or political key term.
One of the methods for revealing the semantics of ambiguous concepts is the 
analysis of co-words, which was originally developed in scientometrics in order 
to categorize the content of scientifi c papers (Callon & al. 1993: chap. 7, de Bellis 
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2009: 143 ff.). If two groups A and B refer to the same social or political key 
term, they should assign to it the same co-words, if the key term has for both 
groups really the same meaning (Smith & al. 2009). Fig. 1 describes this kind of 
consensus for a standardized interview, where co-words like e.g. “agree about X”, 
or “disagree about X”, etc. are represented by value-labels 0, 1, 2,... of an attribute-
dimension X, which matters for the defi nition of the key term. Fig. 1 displays also 
a second situation, where two other groups A‘ and B‘ assign to the same social or 
political key term different co-words, represented by different numeric values on 
the attribute-dimension of this key term. Thus for A‘ and B‘ there is a semantic 
gap , which points to different meanings of the key term for these groups, although 
the key term has for A’ and B’ the same numeric value 1.
Fig. 1 is a simplifi cation in so far as the meaning of a key term generally 
depends not only on one but on several attribute-dimensions, like e.g. the meaning 
of being a “good citizen”. In order to consider this additional complexity one 
may of course add to Fig. 1 other attribute-dimensions. However, these polarity 
profi les are also simplifi cations, since interview data about groups have always 
some inter-individual variation, which is often reduced to simple statistical 
values such as means or medians. One might be tempted to identify the above 
mentioned semantic gap by just comparing the two groups with regard to these 
statistical means or medians on one or several attribute-dimensions. In a certain 
way Fig. 1 represents this kind of simplifi cation with simple statistical measures. 
This approach obviously bears the risk of ecological fallacies (Crow 2006): there 
may for example be dissent between groups A and B about the semantics of a key 
term even if groups A and B have the same mean value on an attribute-dimension, 
but A has a much greater standard deviation with regard to this attribute than B. 
Similarly, signifi cance analyses of statistical t-tests of mean values on an attribute-
dimension tend to overstate relatively small semantic gaps, which are often not 
perceived by the concerned groups, due to the above mentioned intra-group 
variation. Consequently, in an earlier paper about Polish migration to Germany 
(Mueller 2011) the author proposed to measure the amount of potential confl ict 
between immigrants and German residents by a simulation of the virtual encounters 
between the interviewed members of the two groups.
In this article, the above mentioned methodology of virtual encounters will 
fi rst be applied to artifi cial data with controlled variation of means and standard 
deviations of the group-specifi c values on an attribute-dimension. These statistical 
experiments give a better understanding of the results produced by the proposed 
method. Subsequently it will be used in order to study the political semantics of 
left-wing orientation of individual respondents in the European Values Study (EVS 
2008): for three exemplary countries, i.e. France, Sweden, and the UK, we attempt 
to investigate which political values are common to the left of these countries. 
Ask. Vol. 26 (1, 2017): 61–8064
For this purpose we analyze the citizen’s attitudes towards political values social 
security and income equality. It turns out that both values are common elements in 
the self-defi nition of the left in the three countries. However, comparisons between 
the left and the right of each of these countries reveal that social security is in the 
UK and Sweden also an important value of the political right such that it cannot be 
considered as a specifi c value of the left.
The last fi nding points to another important use of the virtual encounter method: 
Intra-national comparisons between different groups. This opens the opportunity 
of comparing party-ideologies also at the national level. Moreover, different 
generations of supporters of a party may this way be compared. Assuming that 
these age-groups represent the respective ideologies of the time when they were 
young and politically socialized, the virtual encounter-method opens by these 
comparisons the possibility of exploring the historical change of party-ideologies. 
2. A THREE-STEP METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING SEMANTIC GAPS
2.1 Step one: Microsimulation of virtual interpersonal confl icts
Conventional datasets with interview data for secondary analysis are generally 
monadic: each data-record describes just one single respondent. This is the standard 
format of most national or international surveys like e.g. the European Values 
Study EVS. Microsimulation of virtual interpersonal dissent or confl ict, however, 
requires dyadic datasets containing data of two interacting persons i and j. Fig. 
2 describes the construction of such dyadic data-records by a random matching 
process, which can be implemented with conventional statistical software like 
SPSS (2015). Randomly permuted fi les of a group A and a group B are trimmed to 
the same length and stuck together such that the data of persons i and j are joined in 
the same dyadic data-record. Virtual confl icts Ci,j between i and j with regard to an 
attribute X can subsequently be determined by calculating the absolute differences 
|Xi-Xj| between the attribute-values Xi and Xj of the two persons. As compared to 
the squared differences (Xi-Xj)
2 used in Euclidean metrics our approach has the 
advantage of being more sensitive to small differences between Xi and Xj, which 
have the same weights as the large ones. The result of this random matching process 
corresponds in a certain way to the situation of modern urban societies where 
spontaneous encounters with strangers are more important than contacts with 
local neighbors (Toennies 1979). However, by selecting appropriate membership 
criteria of the two groups A and B it is possible to limit this randomness of virtual 
encounters and to make in this way all kinds of thought experiments, this being 
a typical advantage of social simulation. The resulting similarity or dissimilarity 
of the group members compared brings the proposed method of virtual encounters 
quite close to one-dimensional propensity score matching (Guo & Fraser 2010), 
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although the algorithms (microsimulation vs. logistic regression) as well as the 
purposes (thought experiments vs. correction of sampling bias) of the two methods 
are rather different.
Fig. 2: The microsimulation of virtual value confl icts between pairs of persons.
2.2 Step two: The transformation of virtual inter-group confl icts into mutual 
virtual group perceptions
By the aggregation of simulated inter-personal virtual confl icts Ci,j it becomes 
possible to calculate mean values of inter-group confl icts: most statistical programs 
like SPSS (2015) offer fi lters, which select pairs of persons with the right group-
characteristics for this process of data-aggregation. The resulting confl ict-scores are 
often hard to assess and consequently call for a reasonable benchmark or reference 
value in order to understand their real importance. The most natural one is the 
average intra-group confl ict (Mueller 2011: 24), which corresponds to the idea 
of (political) homophily (Ackland & Shorish 2014): people mainly communicate 
with peers and the resulting level of confl ict infl uences their expectations with 
regard to other encounters, even if they are less frequent and more virtual. If this 
internal confl ict of group A is lower than the inter-group confl ict with group B, 
we assume that A has a negative virtual perception of B since interactions with B 
produce a higher frequency of unpleasant experiences than the usual intra-group 
interactions (see Fig. 3). If the same intra-group confl ict of A is higher than the 
inter-group confl ict with B, group A is assumed to have a positive virtual perception 
of B. Finally, if the internal confl icts of A and the external with B are about the 
same, the virtual perception of B by A is neutral since interactions with B result 
for group members of A in a “normal” amount of dissent. 
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Fig. 3: The mutual virtual perceptions of two groups A and B as a consequence of their 
intra- and inter-group confl ict.
The same inter-group interactions between A and B may for A have a quality 
other than that for B, since the two groups have different benchmarks defi ned by 
their internal levels of confl ict. Consequently Fig. 3 shows not only 3 but 3 x 3 = 9 
different scenarios with sometimes quite contradictory outcomes: if e.g. B has 
a rather low and A a rather high level of internal confl icts, the virtual interactions 
between A and B have for B a negative and for A a positive quality, as illustrated 
in Fig. 3 by the third column of row one.
2.3 Step three: Network analysis of inter-group confl icts and semantic gaps
Inter-group confl ict can of course be represented as social networks (Wasserman 
& Faust 2007): nodes stand for groups of persons with similar attitudes towards 
a key term and signed bi-directional arcs represent the mutual virtual perceptions 
of these groups, which are either positive, negative, or neutral, as defi ned in 
the previous Fig. 3 by internal and external levels of confl icts. Fig. 4 shows an 
example of such a network: it is the ideal network of the relations between the 
protagonists (pros) of a key term in two countries N and M, and the respective 
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national antagonists (cons) of the same key term. The semantic gap between the 
two national protagonists with regard to the key term is assumed to be close to 
zero, whereas the protagonists and antagonists are supposed to have considerable 
confl ict regarding their attitudes towards the analyzed attribute of the given key 
term. 
Fig. 4: The possible virtual perceptions of the protagonists and antagonists of a key 
term which is specifi c and common to the pros in N and M.
The latter difference is needed in order to ensure that the considered attribute 
of the key term is a specifi c, i.e. unique value of the protagonists and not a value 
that is also shared by the antagonists. Thus, in the best case, the virtual perceptions 
between the protagonists and the antagonists are mutually negative (see Fig. 4). 
This situation corresponds to the classical political cleavage of Rae & Taylor 
(1970). It is, however, also admissible that only one virtual perception of the 
pros and cons is negative and the other zero (see Fig. 4), since in this situation 
the “average” relation between the mentioned groups is still negative. All other 
possible relations between the protagonists and the antagonists are absent from 
Fig. 4: they would imply too much correspondence between the pros and the cons 
such that the analyzed attribute would no longer be a specifi city of the key term 
represented by the pros.
The fi rst assumption of Fig. 4, i.e. the semantic correspondence of the key 
term for the two national groups of protagonists is best represented by the relation 
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(+ , +) between the two groups (see Fig. 4): both groups have virtually a positive 
image of the other since the interaction between them results in less confl ict than 
their respective intra-group interactions. The semantic gap regarding the key term 
is considered to be also relatively small if one group has a positive perception of 
the other while the reverse perception is neutral (see (+ , o) and (o , +) relations of 
Fig. 4). Similar considerations hold for the relation (o , o), which points to a rather 
perfect semantic correspondence of the key term for the two protagonists: in this 
case internal and external levels of confl ict are the same. Finally, we consider also 
the relations (+ , -) and (- , +) between the pros of Fig. 4 as an indicator of semantic 
similarity: they point to situations where the interest of one group in the other 
compensates the virtual hostility of the second towards the fi rst. As we shall see in 
the next section, this situation occurs if the meaning of the key term for the second 
group corresponds to the meaning within a subgroup of the fi rst. Thus there is at 
least some similarity  between the protagonists in the two countries. The remaining 
relations (o , -), (- , o), and (- , -) are not part of the relations between the pros of 
Fig. 4 since they would make the semantic gap of the key term too big, i.e. as big 
as between the pros and the cons.
3. AN EXPLORATION OF THE METHOD WITH ARTIFICIAL DATA
In order to gain additional insights into the method presented in the preceding 
section 2, we applied it to artifi cial random-data, which are divided into three 
groups with 3x200 uniformly distributed attitude values X (see Fig. 5). As 
compared to normal or other distributions, uniformly scattered attitudes X offer 
the advantage of clearly defi ned group-minima and -maxima. Ranges, overlaps, 
and inclusions of group ideologies are relatively well controlled this way and thus 
enable experiments with the following groups: 
Fig. 5: The experimental design of Figs 6a,b and 7: Varying the means of groups B 
and C in relation to the fi xed group A.
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a) Group A has a fi xed mean at X = 0 and fi xed minima and maxima at X = -5 
and X = +5. Its mean is used as the point 0 of the reference that determines the 
relative positions of two other groups B and C.
b) Group B has a smaller range of only 5 units between its maximum and 
minimum. Its mean varies in relation to the fi xed mean of group A such that the 
amount of inter-group confl ict with A can be studied. The result is a u-shaped 
curve, as depicted in Fig. 6a. Representing the inter-group confl ict between A and 
B, this curve is always above the confi dence interval of the internal reference 
confl ict of B. For mean values of B between b and b’ the curve is however below 
the confi dence interval of the reference confl ict of group A. Thus between b and b’ 
group B has a negative virtual image of A, whereas group A has a positive virtual 
perception of B.
Fig. 6a: Comparing meanings: Simulated ideological confl icts between groups A and 
B, by varying mean values of B.
Legend:  Confl. gr. A–B: Conflict between groups A and B;  Ref. gr. A + CI: Upper limit of the 
90%-confidence interval of the reference conflict of A, which was calculated by a 1000 sub- 
samples bootstrap;  Ref. gr. A - CI: Lower limit of the previous 90%-confidence interval;  
Ref. gr. B + CI: Upper limit of the 90%-confidence interval of the reference conflict of B, which 
was calculated by a 1000 sub-samples bootstrap;  [b,b']: Interval of semantic correspondence; 
(+,-): Perceptions of inter-group conflict by A and by B, pointing to semantic correspondence;  
(o,-), (-,-): Perceptions of inter-group conflict by A and by B, pointing to a semantic gap. 
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This situation changes, when the mean of B is beyond the limits b or b’ and 
consequently gets too far away from the mean value 0 of A: in this situation 
A perceives B no longer as positive but rather as neutral or even negative. According 
to Fig. 4 this means that within the interval [b,b’] the meaning of the key term is 
the same for A and B, whereas outside this it is different.
      
Fig. 6b: Comparing meanings: Simulated ideological confl icts between groups A and 
C, by varying mean values of C.
c) Like group A, Group C has a range of 10 units between its minimum and 
maximum values. Consequently its internal reference confl ict and the related 90% 
confi dence interval are the same as for A. By varying the mean of C in relation 
to A it is possible to study the amount of virtual inter-group confl ict between 
A and C. The result is presented in Fig. 6b and shows again a u-shaped confl ict 
Legend: Confl. gr. A–C: Conflict between groups A and C;  Ref. gr. A + CI: Upper limit of the  
90%-confidence interval of the reference conflict of A, which was calculated by a 1000 sub- 
samples bootstrap (= Upper limit of the corresponding interval of C);  Ref. gr. A - CI: Lower  
limit of the previous confidence interval of A (= Lower limit of the corresponding interval of C);  
[c,c']: Interval of semantic correspondence;  (o,o): Perceptions of inter-group conflict by A and 
by C, pointing to semantic correspondence;  (-,-): Perceptions of inter-group conflict by A and 
by C, pointing to a semantic gap. 
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curve. Between the mean values c and c’ the inter-group confl ict between A and 
C is in the 90%-confi dence interval of the internal reference confl ict of A and the 
corresponding identical interval of C. Consequently the mutual virtual perceptions 
of A and C are both neutral. However, after moving the mean value of C beyond 
the limits c or c’, the inter-group confl ict is above the confi dence intervals of the 
internal reference confl icts of A and C such that both virtual perceptions become 
negative. According to Fig. 4, this means that within the interval [c,c’] the meaning 
of the key term is the same for A and C, whereas outside this it is different.
Fig. 7: Comparison of meanings: Conventional t-tests versus simulated virtual confl icts.
In sum, if the mean values of groups A, B, and C are the same (= 0), the key 
term has the same meaning for A and B as well as for A and C, as we expect 
from traditional statistical analyses with t-tests. In the case of A and C with 
identical standard deviations, this correspondence of meanings is indicated by 
mutually neutral perceptions of the two groups. In the case of A and B, where 
Legend: Confl. gr. A–B: Conflict between groups A and B;  Ref. gr. A - CI: Lower limit of 
the 90%-confidence interval of the reference conflict of A, which was calculated by a 1000 
subsamples bootstrap;  Diff. t: gr. A–B:  t-value of the difference between the mean scores 
of groups A and B;  Critical t: Critical value of the previous t for a two-tailed test at the 5% 
level; [b,b’]: Interval of semantic correspondence based on virtual conflicts;  [t,t’]: Interval 
of semantic correspondence based on statistical t-tests. 
Ask. Vol. 26 (1, 2017): 61–8072
B represents an ideological fraction of A, the correspondence of meanings is 
indicated by a mix of positive and negative virtual perceptions. In both situations 
the meaning of the key term is only dissimilar, if the difference of the group means 
goes beyond the respective thresholds b and b’ or c and c’. These intervals of 
semantic correspondence are for the method of virtual encounters much larger 
than the confi dence intervals of the conventional statistical t-tests. Fig. 7 illustrates 
this fact by a comparison between groups A and B. The interval [b,b’] is the same 
as in the previous Fig. 6a and thus based on virtual confl ict. Its limits correspond 
to the critical t-values t and t’ for the equality of the means of A and B. However, 
the extremly small interval [t,t’] seems to overstate the differences in the meaning 
of the social or political key term. Thus the perceived difference of the key term 
based on simulated virtual confl icts is probably a more realistic approach than the 
purely statistical analysis of the original data.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF THE SEMANTICS OF LEFT IDEOLOGIES
4.1 Introduction
This section aims at an exemplary analysis of the political semantics of left 
ideologies (Vincent 2010: chap. 4) in three European countries with rather 
different political traditions (Bartolini 2000: chap. 2, Weakliem & Heath 1999, 
Svallfors 1999): France with a strong communist tradition and a centralist state; 
Sweden with a long history of social-democratic governments stressing the 
importance of social equality; and the United Kingdom (UK), which switched 
under prime minister Tony Blair to a postindustrial version of social democracy 
(New Labour). Differences between the countries mentioned could of course be 
analyzed by studying the offi cial internet platforms of the respective left-wing 
political parties. Here we are more interested in the self-defi nition of leftist 
citizens. In the long run, their power as voters is more important for what left-
wing politics really mean. Consequently we will focus on comparative survey-
data about their political views.
A relatively useful data-source for our purpose is the European Values Study 
(EVS 2008). For the three countries mentioned it contains among other things 
information about the following three variables:
a) The self-positioning of the respondents on a political left-right scale 
(= variable V193). The corresponding EVS-interview question started with the 
remark that “in political matters people talk of the left and the right “ and continued 
with the request to place ones “own views” on a 10-point scale with the anchors 
“left” (= 1) and “right (= 10) (EVS 2008: Master Questionnaire). The statistical 
distribution of the original data (see Fig. 8) suggests the exclusion of the value 
V193 = 5, which is not only the modus of the distribution but also a remarkable 
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outlier far beyond the maximum of the Gaussian bell-curve. This category in the 
middle probably contains many politically uninterested or uninformed voters 
(Rodon 2015, Scholz & Züll 2016). The remaining data are divided into two 
groups: V193 ≤ 4 as partisans of the left and V193 ≥ 6 as partisans of the right. 
These are rather broad categories, which are suffi ciently robust to cope with the 
imprecision of the self-identifi cation on the left-right continuum, as reported by 
Bauer & al. (2017).
b) The personal approval of social security (= variable V194) as an alternative 
to responsibility for one’s own wellbeing, which is also measured on a 1 to 10 
scale: people were asked whether “the state (or the individuals) should take more 
responsibility for providing for themselves” (EVS 2008: Master Questionnaire). 
As usual, it is assumed that the scale has interval properties and the semantic 
distance between adjacent values is always the same.
c) The subjective importance of income equality, with values from 1 (lowest) 
to 10 (highest). It corresponds to 11-V198, i.e. the inverse of the original EVS-
variable V198, which has a different polarity than the previous variable (b). In the 
original EVS-interview respondents were asked whether “there should be greater 
incentives for individual efforts” or “incomes should be made more equal” (EVS 
2008: Master Questionnaire). As in the case of the previous scale it is assumed that 
11-V198 has the properties of an interval scale.
Fig. 8: The statistical distribution of the analyzed respondents on the left-right 
continuum of variable V193 (see EVS 2008).
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According to empirical and theoretical work of Gelissen (2002: 68, 81, 104, 
119) social security and income inequality are both correlated with the self-
identifi cation of respondents with left ideologies. In addition a study by Bauer & 
al. (2017, Fig. 10) about Germany mentions also solidarity and justice as values 
of the left. However with EVS (2008) as the main data source of this section 
these values are diffi cult to measure. Thus, in view of its illustrative character we 
confi ne the analysis of this section to the previously mentioned attributes, social 
security and income equality. 
On the basis of 1000 randomly permuted individuals from France, Sweden 
and the UK we fi rst built six dyadic fi les (see Fig. 2), which matched nationals of 
the following pairs of countries: France – Sweden, France – UK, Sweden – UK, 
France – France, Sweden – Sweden, and UK – UK. Thus each of the resulting 
dyadic fi les contained 1000 cases. This data base allowed us to calculate absolute 
value differences with regard to social security and income equality for pairs of 
persons selected according to two different types of political orientation: partisans 
of the left (V193 ≤ 4) and of the right (V193 ≥ 6) who are assumed to represent 
the respective ideologies. The results of these calculations could be used in order 
to estimate the mean values and the respective 90%-confi dence intervals of the 
virtual confl icts between and within the countries analyzed. Confi dence intervals 
were calculated by a bootstrap-procedure (Mooney & Duval 1993) implemented 
in SPSS (2015) that processed 1000 subsamples. The results of all these statistical 
calculations are presented in Figs. 9 and 10.
4.2 Results for the left political value social security
Fig. 9 suggests that social security is a rather universal value of the European left: 
there seems to be consensus about this value between the French, the British, and 
the Swedish left: the inter-group confl ict always corresponds to the intra-group 
confl ict such that the mutual virtual perceptions of the three left parties are neutral 
(zero). Nonetheless it is problematic to consider social security as a central element 
of the ideology of the left in the countries mentioned. Certainly in the UK and to 
a lesser extent also in Sweden there is no virtual confl ict between the left and the 
right about this political issue, which means that the support for social security has 
in these countries spread to the political right and is consequently not a specifi c 
value of the left. As the cleavage-like value confl ict between the left and the right 
in France demonstrates, it is only in this country that social security is a specifi c 
endeavor of the political left.
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Fig. 9: Simulated virtual confl icts with regard to social security.
4.3 Results for the left political value income equality
Contrary to the case of social security, income equality is a specifi c value of the 
political left. According to Fig. 10, the relations between the left and the right 
are confl ictive in all three countries analyzed, with at least one negative virtual 
perception of the opposite party. As a consequence of this comparatively high 
specifi city of income equality, the virtual confl icts between the left and the right 
of all three countries are greater for income equality than for social security (see 
inter-group confl icts of Figs 9 and 10). In addition, income equality is a common 
value of the left in these countries: inter-group confl icts between the French and 
the British left are comparable to the respective internal benchmarks and thus 
point to a high value consensus between these groups. Moreover, the French and 
 
 
Legend: C: Inter-group conflict; Cref +e/-e' = Reference conflict (see text) with 
upper limit e and lower limit e' of a 90%-confidence interval, which was calculated 
by a 1000 subsamples bootstrap; + relation: C < Cref - e';  - relation: C > Cref + e; 
o relation: C § Cref +e/-e'; N = number of cases. 
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the British left both have a positive virtual image of the Swedish left, whereas the 
reverse perception is neutral (see Fig. 10). According to Fig. 4 this implies a value 
consensus between the British and the Swedish as well as between the Swedish 
and the French left.
Fig. 10: Simulated virtual confl icts with regard to income equality.
5. CRITICAL SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In section 4 of this article we wanted to answer the question, whether left ideology 
has the same meaning in different countries. In order to answer this question we 
simulated virtual encounters between persons who participated in the European 
Values Study (EVS 2008). In general, this method has the advantage of giving 
a more realistic picture of inter- and intra-group confl ict than the traditional 
Legend: Like legend of Fig. 9, but for income equality. 
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statistical methods based on group-means of conventional data sets. By 
comparing the same virtual inter-group confl ict with two different group-specifi c 
internal confl ict references, it is possible to identify confl ict asymmetries (see 
Fig. 3). Moreover, these intra-group references relativize small but semantically 
unimportant variations in the meaning of the social or political key terms analyzed: 
the approach proposed in this article tends to annihilate such differences, even if 
they are statistically signifi cant (see Fig. 7).
By means of the microsimulation method mentioned above we were able 
to compare the French, British, and Swedish left with regard to two values as 
examples: income equality and social security. It seems that only income equality 
is a common and specifi c value of the left in these countries (see Fig. 10). The 
other tested attribute, i.e. social security, is a shared but generally not very specifi c 
value of the left in the political systems analyzed (see Fig. 9). This corresponds to 
the fi ndings of a study by Bauer et al. (2017: Fig. 10), where Germans were asked 
open-ended interview questions about the meaning of the term “left” in politics.
These empirical fi ndings may however be infl uenced by the following 
limitations in the research design of the present study:
a) The number of attributes of the key term, which in a follow-up study should 
certainly be enlarged in order to give a really complete picture of the shared and 
specifi c values of the left: interview questions about solidarity and justice could 
e.g. be used to gain more refi ned empirical results about left ideologies (see Bauer 
& al. 2017, Fig. 10). However, as mentioned earlier, they are not directly available 
in the EVS (2008) analyzed in this article and thus require other datasets.
b) The number of countries: There are many other countries in the European 
Values Study, which could have been included in this analysis. Countries in 
Eastern Europe with a Soviet communist past, or liberal welfare states with a lack 
of social security (Esping-Andersen 1993: chap. 1, Gelissen 2002: chap. 2) would 
be examples of great interest for such additional analyses.
c) The number of observations in the dyadic fi les: for technical reasons it was 
limited to 1000 pairs of persons. This is only a very small fraction of the 1 to 4 
million pairs of respondents that can be constructed with 1 to 2 thousand original 
interviews per nation. Hence, it would be possible to increase the sample size of 
the current study in order to reduce the width of the confi dence intervals of the 
simulated confl icts (Cramer & Howitt 2004: 32–35), which in turn would increase 
the statistical signifi cance of the network relations of Figs. 9 and 10. This could be 
performed by a computer program that creates a theoretically unlimited sequence 
of pairs of random numbers, which identify the individuals to be matched and 
compared.
The virtual encounter method described in this article is not only suited for 
international but also for intra-national comparisons of the semantics of political 
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values. For such comparisons there are generally even more data available than 
for international analyses. Intra-national simulations may e.g. shed light on the 
ideological differences between similar parties like the traditional and the new 
populist right. They might help to understand the ideological differences between 
the German AfD and the Bavarian CSU, where the proposed method takes the 
voters and not the politicians as the real experts of these ideologies. Similarly, 
by virtual encounter simulations one might compare different generations of 
representatives of ideologies. Is there for example a virtual confl ict between the 
feminists born before 1980 and the younger generations? And if so, how will 
this confl ict evolve in the future since there is a secular trend in the demographic 
weights of the two groups. Tackling the latter question with the virtual encounter 
method shows another advantage of this type of social simulation: it answers 
“what-if” questions represented by interesting political and social scenarios.
NOTES
1  This article is an updated and enlarged version of an earlier working paper of the same 
author, published as Mueller (2016).
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